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The Nature of Metropolitan Governance in Urban America:
A Study of Cooperation, Conflict, and Avoidance in the Kansas City Region
Abstract
In this study I determine the dominant pattern of governance in the 8-county Kansas City
metropolitan area based on interviews with 46 city administrative officers in cities over 2,500 in
population. Consistent with theories of cooperation, I found that the dominant governance
strategy is intergovernmental cooperation in the delivery of public services but that cooperation
is punctuated by conflict and avoidance when intergovernmental service delivery arrangements
involve infrequent interaction between public entities and when the presence and influence of the
regional council of government is limited.
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The Nature of Metropolitan Governance in Urban America:
A Study of Cooperation, Conflict, and Avoidance in the Kansas City Region
“If the central city gets cancer, then we’re all in trouble.”
Fred Siems, former City Administrator of Blue Springs, Missouri

A visitor from another planet approaching the Kansas City metropolitan region, or any
region, from above would be able to discern natural barriers and landmarks such as rivers, hills,
trees, and lakes as well as human creations such as roads, buildings, and parcels of land. What
the visitor from another planet would not be able to see are the political and legal boundaries
dividing cities, counties and states superimposed by humankind upon the landscape. Although
not visible physically, these political and legal boundaries are no less real and influential. The
greater Kansas City metropolitan area, like almost all American metropolitan areas, is
characterized by very high governmental fragmentation in that about 1.7 million people reside
within 114 cities and 8 counties located in two states and all loosely bound together by a regional
council of government without much legal powers.
What is the nature of intergovernmental relations in a highly fragmented metropolis?
Using the Savitch and Vogel (1996a) typology of intergovernmental relations, I test theories of
cooperation. Consistent with theories of cooperation, I expect to find that the dominant
governance strategy will be intergovernmental cooperation punctuated by conflict or avoidance
when there is little intergovernmental interaction or expectation of interaction, and when the
involvement of the regional council of government is limited. I posit that the delivery of public
services through intergovernmental joint initiatives and partnerships with the regional council of
government make it possible to minimize conflict and maximize cooperation by building social
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capital between political and administrative actors at the local level, reducing agency problems,
and facilitating institutional collective action.
H.V. Savitch and Ronald Vogel (1996a) analyzed the patterns of intergovernmental and
public-private relations in metropolitan areas and found that the dominant patterns of governance
in metropolitan regions could be categorized as mutual adjustment or conflict/avoidance. Mutual
adjustment is a concept first articulated by Lindblom (1965) whereby public officials in one
jurisdiction take account of another jurisdiction when making decisions that affect their
jurisdiction. Lindblom contended that coordination did not have to be direct; it could be indirect.
Savitch and Vogel expanded Lindblom’s notion of mutual adjustment as indirect coordination to
include direct coordination and cooperation between governments or even between governments
and the private sector. Patterns of avoidance and conflict are evident when there is little
coordination and cooperation between jurisdictions, when there are weak regional institutions,
and when there is much competition and/or defection. The metropolitan areas of Washington
D.C. (Henig, Brunori, and Ebert, 1996) and Pittsburgh (Jezierski, 1996) were found to practice
mutual adjustment while metropolitan Los Angeles (Saltzstein, 1996), New York City (Berg and
Kantor, 1996), and St. Louis (Phares and Louishomme, 1996) were classified as exhibiting
patterns of avoidance and conflict. Public-private regimes were found to be dominant in the
Pittsburgh region.
What Savitch and Vogel (1996b) found was that formal and informal forms of
cooperation have taken root even in regions where the dominant governance strategy is conflict
or avoidance, and jurisdictions endeavor to deal with problems that increasingly transcend
jurisdictional boundaries. For example they found that even the most constrained cases of
regional cooperation have fashioned their own institutions like New York’s Port Authority, non-
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elected bi-state agencies such as in St. Louis, or by relying on special districts in Los Angeles.
According to Savitch and Vogel (1996b), the process of eliciting cooperation creeps along
slowly. Regionalism is more analogous to a glacier than a shooting star (Savitch and Vogel,
1996b).
I contend that the nature of horizontal intergovernmental relations in the metropolis can
be explained by the frequency of contact between the actors and the presence of a central
network broker such as a council of government. Social network theory supports the notion that
the long-term nature of intergovernmental relationships leads to “norms of reciprocity” that can
be a stronger incentive for intergovernmental contracts or joint service agreements than purely
self-interested economizing (Thurmaier and Wood 2002). An important strategy for reducing
environmental uncertainty is gathering and sharing information with other organizations
(Galaskiewicz 1979, 20-21). Through the sharing of information, jurisdictions can reduce
information transaction costs and devote scarce resources to more effective service delivery.
Over time, the series of network exchanges can foster a “tradition of cooperation” (Wilkes 1975,
7) that induces further forms of cooperation.
Robert Axelrod (1981) developed a theory of cooperation that can be used to discover
what conditions are necessary for cooperation to emerge. By understanding what conditions
allow cooperation to emerge, appropriate actions can be taken to sustain cooperation in a specific
setting. The results from the Axelrod experiments demonstrate that cooperation can indeed
emerge in a world of egoists without central authority when players realize they might interact
again. On the other hand, when a player knows they will not meet the other person again, then
one will be inclined to defect now because the future does not cast a long shadow.
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Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (1994) also contend that it is possible for participants to
solve common pool resource (CPR) dilemmas without necessarily resorting to centralized
external authority when opportunities for communication are present. Using the same logic as
Axelrod, it may be possible for metropolitan cities facing common social, economic, and
technical problems that involve extensive negative externalities, to create their own selfgoverning institutions such as rules and agreements that optimize collective and regional
outcomes. Encouraging interaction between jurisdictions and voluntary participation in a
regional council of government that provides frequent opportunities for joint initiatives and
coordination may be an efficient and effective way to deliver public services and address
political, economic, and social issues that do not respect or recognize political boundaries. As
governments collaborate with each other and through regional institutions like a council of
government, trust is created that increases the chance of future interactions and collaboration. As
governments gain greater trust in the council of government, they will be willing to delegate
more authority to this body to act in the regional interest, which leads to more regional
integration and a larger sense of regional community.
John Nash (found in Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994) was among the first to
distinguish between cooperative and non-cooperative games. In cooperative games, players can
communicate with each other freely and make enforceable agreements; in non-cooperative
games they can do neither. More recently, Edella Schlager, William Bloomquist, Shui Yan Tang,
and Arun Agrawal (found in Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994) found empirical support for the
proposition that in common pool resources (CPR) social dilemmas involving fisheries,
groundwater systems, irrigation systems, and forestry management, where “individuals do not
know one another, cannot communicate effectively, and thus cannot develop agreements, norms,
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and sanctions, aggregate predictions derived from models of rational individuals in a noncooperative game receive substantial support” (page 319). In a non-interactive system, others are
likely to over appropriate or under provide the common pool resource, and/or engage in high
levels of conflict about assignment or technological externality problems. In other words, noncommunication usually leads to collective action problems characterized by defection, shirking,
and self-interested behavior. These researchers found that communication improves efficiency
and, consistent with the findings of Axelrod, that the inability to communicate on a repeated
basis limited the durability of their agreements.
Empirical analysis demonstrates that those who have developed forms of mutual trust and
social capital through regular communication have the wherewithal to avert the CPR dilemma or
collective action problems and arrive at reasonable outcomes, or even outcomes approaching
optimality (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, 1994). In other words, “boundedly rational individuals
with heuristics that involve cooperation and extending trust are often able to reach and sustain
agreements, and that boundedly rational individuals without such heuristics are not” (page 324)
and that “individuals who extend reciprocity to others and who learn to craft their own effective
rules can accomplish more than individuals who do not, especially when they can identify others
following the same heuristics” (327-328).
The institutional collective action (ICA) theory posited by Feiock (2004) provides
another framework for understanding a system of cooperative intergovernmental relations in a
metropolis. Richard C. Feiock (2002) argues that intergovernmental collective action is
“motivated by a desire to achieve a collective benefit that could not be achieved by solitary
action” (7). Intergovernmental cooperative actions and institutions also arise because actual or
potential benefits are high and transaction costs are low (Hackathorn and Maser, 1987, found in
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Feiock, 2004). The transaction costs of interlocal service delivery arrangements are likely to be
low because government officials share the same policy objectives (Post, 2004; Provan and
Milward, 2001) and professional and electoral networks (Ostrom, 1998; Frederickson, 1999;
Wikstrom, 2002), and because existing institutions or actors such as the state, a council of
government, or policy entrepreneurs serve as a broker to facilitate social capital and shoulder a
portion of the workload and/or financing (Feiock, 2004). Policy entrepreneurs such as locally
elected officials and city managers can also “be instrumental in overcoming opposition to local
intergovernmental opposition” (Post, 2004, 79).
In the summer of 2003, I 1 conducted face-to-face interviews with 46 2 of the 47 city
administrators in the Kansas City region in cities over 2,5000 population to determine the
frequency and nature of intergovernmental service delivery arrangements in the 8-county Kansas
City region across 28 services. 3 City administrators were asked to identify which sub-regional
(intra-county) and regional (across counties) service delivery options best characterized how
each of the 28 public services was delivered. 4 Table 1 below shows the frequency and types of
service delivery arrangements that were evident across the 46 cities and 28 public services.
Based on city administrator responses, I was able to identify 2,576 service delivery
arrangements, 1,638 at the sub-regional (intra-county) level and 938 at the regional (intercounty) level. Of the 2,576 service delivery arrangements, 1,848, or about 72 percent, of all
service delivery arrangements involved an intergovernmental alliance, 474, or about 18 percent,
involved the city independently providing a service in-house, and 254, or about 10 percent,
involved the city contracting out a service. Of the 1,848 intergovernmental arrangements, 518,
or 28 percent, were joint initiatives with other public agencies; 472, or 25.5 percent, were when
another public entity provides the service for the city; 459, or about 25 percent, involved an
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alliance with the regional council of government; 175, or 9.5 percent, were intergovernmental
contractual arrangements; 122, or 6.6 percent, were joint agreements with the private sector; 68,
or 3.7 percent, were when a city specializes in a service that benefits or is used by citizens in
other jurisdictions; and 34, or about 2 percent, involved a city-city or city-county consolidation.
Table 1: Types and Frequency of Service Delivery Arrangements

Service Method
Contracted Out
In-house
Joint contract with private
sector
Joint Initiative
Contract
Service Transfer
Specialize in a Service
Consolidate
Mid-America Regional
Council
Totals

Number of
Sub-regional
Arrangements
(%)
254 (15.5%)
474 (28.9%)

Number of
Regional
Arrangements
(%)
-

Total Number of
Service Delivery
Arrangements
(%)
254 (9.9%)
474 (18.4%)

37 (2.3%)

85 (9.1%)

122 (4.7%)

333 (20.3%)
105 (6.4%)
341 (20.8%)
60 (3.7%)
34 (2.1%)

185 (19.7%)
70 (7.5%)
131 (14%)
8 (.85%)
-

518 (20.1%)
175 (6.8%)
472 (18.3%)
68 (2.6%)
34 (1.3%)

-

459 (49%)

459 (17.8%)

1,638 (100%)

938 (100%)

2,576 (100%)

Overall, joint initiatives were the most common form of intergovernmental service
delivery arrangement. Joint initiatives were closely followed by the reliance upon other
governments or quasi-governments (other cities, the county, special districts, and public
authorities), and then partnerships with the regional council of government.
Of the 1,638 sub-regional service delivery arrangements, 910, or about 56 percent,
involved intergovernmental arrangements. Of the 910 intergovernmental service delivery
arrangements, 341, or about 36 percent involved another jurisdiction (usually the county)
providing the service for the city; 333, or 37 percent, involved joint initiatives; 105, or 12
percent, involved contracting the service to another jurisdiction; 60, or 7 percent, involved a city
specializing in a service for other cities in the county; 37, or 4 percent, involved the city working
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in concert with other cities to contract with the private sector; and 34, or 4 percent, involved the
consolidation of services between the City of Kansas City, Missouri and Wyandotte County,
Kansas in 1997 and the cities of Mission and Countryside, Kansas in 2002.
At the regional level, there were 938 intergovernmental service delivery arrangements,
almost half (49 percent) of which directly or indirectly involve a partnership with the regional
council of government, Mid-America Regional Council (MARC). The next most common type
of service delivery arrangement was a joint initiative followed by cities relying on another public
entity to provide the service.
Interviews with the city administrators revealed that cities partner with MARC, either
directly or indirectly, in the delivery of between 5 and 16 different services, or an average of 10
services for each city. It is primarily through MARC that alliances and contacts with public
officials, both elected and professional, across county and state lines are developed and
sustained. Were it not for MARC, many alliances would occur only at the sub-regional level.
MARC is able to serve as the regional broker and coordinator through its decentralized
governance process that involves locally elected and professional officials in planning, agenda
setting, policymaking and implementation. This finding suggests that MARC is an important
vehicle for overcoming barriers to institutional collective action posed by state, county, and
municipal boundaries.
However, this research also found that MARC is more involved in some services than in
other services. Cities are most likely involved with MARC in the following areas: 9-1-1 services,
public transit, aging services, public health, child care, parks/trails, purchasing, emergency
medical services, emergency preparedness, stormwater, solid waste disposal, and solid waste
collection. MARC plays a lesser role across the region in airports, economic development,
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sewage collection and treatment, contractor licensing, fire, tourism, and land use planning, and is
not involved with police, jails, recreation programs, or zoos.
During the interviews with the 46 city administrators, I also asked city administrators
whether 1) intergovernmental service delivery arrangements in 28 public services result in
cooperation, conflict, or avoidance, 2) to what extent they are satisfied with intergovernmental
service delivery arrangements, and 3) if they personally believe that intergovernmental service
delivery arrangements impose too many limits on the city’s independence of action. Below I
summarize and analyze the interview results for each question.
1) Intergovernmental cooperation, conflict, and avoidance
The city administrators’ responses demonstrate that intergovernmental relations in the
delivery of the 28 services are generally cooperative; however, cooperation is punctuated by
conflict in certain cities and services. City administrators in 19 of the 46 cities reported that
intergovernmental service delivery arrangements were cooperative across all 28 services.
However, 27 city administrators, or 59 percent, reported that moderate conflict is present in 11
services, or 39 percent of all services. Twelve of these city administrators, or 44 percent,
reported that conflict is serious enough in six of the services (water, annexation/zoning,
wastewater, economic development, fire mutual aid, and border streets) to jeopardize future
partnerships. Intergovernmental cooperation is punctuated by serious conflict in about onequarter of the cities and services included in this study.
Of the 27 city administrators that reported some conflict with other jurisdictions in the
delivery of services, five reported conflict with the county or another city over zoning, growth,
and annexation issues, five reported disputes with a water district or the county over the
extension of water service, and four reported competition with other jurisdictions in economic
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development initiatives. Four administrators reported difficulty with their respective county
government in the provision of wastewater services and three cities reported difficulty in dealing
with the county emergency management director. Three administrators reported conflict with
another city in implementing police and fire mutual aid agreements. Two administrators reported
problems with another city in sharing the maintenance and responsibility for border streets. One
city administrator mentioned conflict with the county regarding the delivery of ambulance
service and services to the elderly. One city administrator reported a disagreement with another
city as to the price charged for treating wastewater. Finally, one city administrator reported that
personalities, not issues resulting from service delivery, interfered with partnerships.
Interviews with the 46 city administrators reveal that a majority of the conflict
between a city and another public entity occurs when a city contracts with another public entity
for services, when another public entity such as the county or special district is responsible for
providing the service to city residents, and when the regional council of government is not
actively engaged. When a city enters into an intergovernmental contract or another public entity
provides the service for city residents, the city gives up a measure of authority and influence over
service delivery and unless there is a problem interaction between the public entities is
infrequent. In most situations involving conflict, avoidance, and competition such as economic
development, tourism, and growth related issues it is interesting to note that the regional council
is not actively engaged.
Conversely, city administrators mention few instances of conflict or avoidance when a
city interacts regularly with another public agency in the joint delivery of public services or
when the regional council is actively involved. This finding supports theories of cooperation that
frequent interaction and the involvement of a common network broker builds social capital, trust,
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and cooperation between parties and that non-interactive arrangements tend to evolve into noncooperative behavior.
2) Satisfaction with intergovernmental service delivery arrangements
City administrators were asked whether their overall level of satisfaction with
intergovernmental service delivery arrangements could be described as always satisfied, usually
satisfied, usually unsatisfied, or always unsatisfied. All but three of the city administrators
indicated they were “usually satisfied” with the outcomes of intergovernmental service delivery
arrangements. The other three administrators stated they were “always satisfied.” This finding
may explain why intergovernmental service delivery arrangements are more common than
independently providing a service in-house or contracting out and suggests that
intergovernmental social service delivery arrangements are likely to become durable.
3) Perceived Autonomy within intergovernmental service delivery arrangements
City administrators were asked whether they personally believe that intergovernmental
service delivery arrangements impose too many limits on the city’s independence of action. Only
three city administrators indicated that intergovernmental arrangements excessively infringed
upon their jurisdiction’s autonomy and sovereignty. In one of these cities, the city administrator
reported that the city simply defected by terminating the relationship with another government
when there were problems or conflict.
This finding may also explain why intergovernmental service delivery arrangements are
the preferred service delivery method in the Kansas City region.
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Examples of Mutual Adjustment, Conflict, and Avoidance
In the final section of this paper, I illustrate stories of regional cooperation, conflict and
avoidance, created from the interviews with city administrators, The Kansas City Star editorials
and articles, and interviews with some of the actors in these cases.
Regional Intergovernmental Cooperation: The Pursuit of Regional Public Safety
One would suppose that law enforcement in two states, 8 counties, and 141 cities in the
Kansas City metro area would be disjointed, complicated, and chaotic. To be sure, coordinated
law enforcement can be a challenge, especially across state lines. However, the two cases below
illustrate that considerable coordination and cooperation does exist between police departments
in different jurisdictions across the region that make it possible to effectively enforce the myriad
laws found throughout the region.
1) The Regional Prostitution Sting Operation. During the weekend of June 14th, 2003,
detectives and police officers from 13 cities located in seven counties, including cities in both
Kansas and Missouri, successfully conducted the first metro-wide prostitution sting that resulted
in the arrest of 100 persons. According to Sargeant Brad Dumit of the Kansas City, Missouri
police department, “It was the largest local sting of its kind. Everyone worked well together and
we were very successful” (Vendel and Rice 2003, B2). “Nobody can recall doing anything with
this many agencies for this purpose” (Vendel 2003, B1). “Dumit hopes the effort will be the
beginning of a long-term, collaborative fight against prostitution across the area and across state
lines” (B1). “A lot of smaller cities don’t have vice units”, he said. “We can accomplish more if
we combine our manpower and resources” (B1).
Sargeant Dumit informed me that the sting effort involved the coordination and
participation of seven cities in Missouri and six cities in Kansas. 5
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2) The Regional Metro Squad. In the summer of 2002 an 18-year-old lifeguard at an Overland
Park, swimming pool, was brutally murdered in the pump house. In the months that followed, a
team of detectives from various jurisdictions throughout the metro, known as the metro squad,
pursued her murderer. Just recently, law enforcement officials notified the public they had
apprehended a suspect.
Almost every city administrator indicated the city had participated in the metro squad by
contributing available detectives to help solve a heinous crime somewhere in the region, or they
had received assistance from the metro squad to solve a serious crime that had been committed in
their community. The metro squad provides the necessary human resources and expertise that is
not available to a single jurisdiction and makes it possible to enhance the quality of law
enforcement for all citizens in the region no matter where they live.
Regional Intergovernmental Conflict
1) The Chamber of Commerce Border Raid. On August 21, 1863, at the height of the Civil War,
James Quantrill, a pro-slavery Missourian, and his band of men crossed the state line and under
the cover of darkness and burned much of downtown Lawrence, Kansas, a haven for abolitionist
Jayhawkers. One hundred and forty two years later, when the Greater Kansas City Chamber of
Commerce announced that they were going to open a satellite office with two employees in
Johnson County, Kansas for the purpose of providing space for meetings and to lobby on behalf
of its Johnson County members 6 , one would have thought that the Civil War had begun anew.
An outraged mayor from Overland Park, Kansas, claimed that the Greater Kansas City
Chamber of Commerce was a Missouri organization and their move was an attempt to solicit
members from Johnson County and entice Kansas companies to come to Missouri (Alm 2003b).
“This raises the bar on aggressive competition, and that is the viewpoint of many people”, said
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the mayor (Alm 2003b, C1), who acknowledged a bit of wounded pride over the planned move
of nearly 2,000 Internal Revenue Service employees from Overland Park and Lenexa to Kansas
City, Missouri (Alm 2003b, C1). Other local chamber officials complained that the Greater
Kansas City Chamber had rarely fought for Kansas’s business interests in Topeka the way it did
for Missouri firms in Jefferson City (Alm 2003a). Blake Schreck, president of the Lenexa,
Kansas Chamber said, “this has gone beyond strong concern to opposition…. It [the opening of
the office] seems aggressive and provocative” (Alm 2003b, C5). The public announcement that
the Greater Kansas City Chamber was going to open an office caught some Johnson County
chamber and governmental officials off guard (Babson 2003). Not discussing this move with
Johnson County officials before it was publicly announced reinforced the feeling by some
Johnson County officials that they are being taken for granted (Babson 2003).
The Greater Kansas City Chamber of Commerce President Pete Levi responded to the
Johnson County outrage and criticism by saying that the Greater Kansas City Chamber was not
trying to drive wedges and that the organization was doing its best to promote and represent the
entire metropolitan region as a single regional community (Alm 2003b, C5). Others, like Fred
Logan, a member of the Kansas City chamber board who voted to open an office in Johnson
County and who is also a member of the Overland Park Chamber of Commerce, said that “the
simple fact of the matter is there’s a role for all these chambers to play” (Alm 2003b, C5). Jerry
Heaster (2003), columnist for The Kansas City Star, stated, “in my experience, nobody has ever
indicated any concern that belonging to both their local and metro-wide chambers compromises
the mission of either organization. Most see their roles as complementary” (page C2). The
Kansas City Star (2003a) came to the defense of the Greater Kansas City Chamber of Commerce
by noting that in May 2003, 1,500 members of the Greater Kansas City Chamber, many who live
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in Missouri, crossed the state line to attend a technology conference at the Overland Park,
Kansas Convention Center and in the process contribute to the Johnson County economy. The
Star also noted that the Greater Kansas City Chamber of Commerce was in the process of
coordinating a visit of congressional staffers who are examining federal funding needs in the
entire metropolitan area, not just on the Missouri side.
As a result of the brouhaha between the Greater Kansas City Chamber and local Johnson
County chamber and government officials, the Greater Kansas City Chamber announced it
would postpone the creation of the satellite office in Johnson County for at least 6 months while
both sides do more networking and try to come to some sort of mutual agreement (Babson 2003).
The Kansas City chamber and Johnson County officials released a joint statement in which they
pledged to “establish ways to work cooperatively on issues of mutual concern” (Babson 2003,
C3). A taskforce has been formed to identify issues that they can agree on and mutually support.
This story illustrates the deep division, distrust, and competition that still exist between
business and political officials in Missouri and Kansas, especially in the area of economic
development and tourism. This case clearly illustrates the barriers created by historical divisions,
political boundaries, and the tension between regional and local interests. This story also
illustrates how non-communication and avoidance can result in conflict and mistrust. On a more
positive note, this case illustrates how a strategy of mutual restraint can have positive results. A
perceived provocation by the Greater Kansas City Chamber of Commerce was immediately
followed by a forceful response by Johnson County chambers and public officials. However,
rather than retaliate with equal force and intensity or defect, the Greater Kansas City Chamber of
Commerce used a measured response by delaying the decision until both sides could resolve the
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issue through dialogue and negotiation. Now the opportunity exists to achieve mutual
understanding and an accommodation.
Regional Intergovernmental Avoidance
1) An Arena: Let the Race Begin and to the Victors Belong the Spoils. The former city
administrator of Lenexa who served 19 years as city administrator and who was one of the most
connected and respected managers in the region told me that economic development issues are
the most competitive and divisive. This case will corroborate the Lenexa city administrator’s
claim.
The talk of building an arena has been heating up in the Kansas City region, with officials
in Kansas City, Missouri; Olathe, Kansas; Kansas City, Kansas; Edwardsville, Kansas, and
Overland Park, Kansas competing to build the region’s first sports arena in nearly three decades.
A study released by the Greater Kansas City Sports Commission recommended Kansas
City, Missouri spend as much as $200 million to build a 20,000 seat arena in downtown Kansas
City and renovate Kemper arena (Spivak 2003). According to the study, an arena is needed to
stop sports events from leaving town, lure new minor-league sports teams, pump new life into
the downtown, and keep Kansas City competitive with similar sized cities (Spivak 2003).
According to the study, the current arena, Kemper Arena, lacks many of the features and
amenities that patrons have come to expect in a facility (Spivak 2003). The new facility is
expected to draw as many as 850,000 spectators a year (Spivak 2003).
In nearby Olathe, Kansas, developers have proposed and the city council has approved a
$140 million project to build a shopping center, a 280-300 room hotel, and an 8,000-seat arena
near 119th Street and 35 highway, just about 30 minutes drive away from the proposed
downtown Kansas City arena project (Cooper 2003b).
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In nearby Wyandotte County, Kansas, there are two potential arena projects in the
making. The owner of the new minor-league baseball team wants to develop a 7,500 to 9,500seat arena next to the new minor league ballpark in Village West where the new NASCAR
racetrack is located (The Kansas City Star 2003b). In Edwardsville, Kansas, just a few miles
from Village West, the city council has approved a $491 million project to build an 8,500-seat
arena, 800,000 square feet of retail, an indoor multi-sport facility, four hotels, and a golf course
surrounded by 385 homes (Wiebe 2003). The project would be partially funded by special tax
incentives from the state of Kansas.
Most recently, developers have stepped forward to build an arena in Overland Park,
Kansas. A development team plans to build a 7,500-seat arena along with a retail complex, worth
about $140 million near the Sprint World Headquarters. The arena would be the home to the
minor league Central Hockey League team. The project has been promoted as a tool to lure
conventions to Overland Park to ensure the financial success of the new Overland Park
convention center and hotel that are currently experiencing severe deficits. The project will need
an infusion of $62 million in tax incentives from the state of Kansas similar to the incentives
used to finance the Kansas Speedway and Village West in Kansas City, Kansas.
Bill Hall, chairman of the Greater Kansas City Sports Commission, has described the
race by these communities to build a new arena in the Kansas City area as “an attempt to
cannibalize each other” (The Kansas City Star 2003b, B3). City officials and most developers in
the competing communities generally believe that the first community to build an arena will
attract the necessary teams and events and that only one arena can be profitable in the Kansas
City area. “Our impression is whoever is first in the ground will build the arena. They’re very
similar uses and venues”, said John Bayless, the Edwardsville city engineer (Knight-Ridder
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Newspapers 2003, B8). “I think clearly, first in wins”, said Mike Thiessen (The Kansas City
Star 2003b, B8), who represents Wyandotte County’s ballpark and arena developers. “I am
convinced that there will be one arena in the metro area and that will be the first one,” said
Kansas City businessman Don Thomason, who submitted a bid to build an arena in Olathe
(Cooper, 2003a, B2). However, Tim McKee, vice president of economic development for the
Olathe Chamber of Commerce, said he didn’t think that two arenas would undercut each other,
even if they were only 20 miles apart (Wiebe 2003) because their uses would be complementary
and not duplicative. The mayor of Kansas City, Missouri said she also did not think the Overland
Park arena plans would interfere with Kansas City’s plans for a new downtown arena (Cooper
2003c). Likewise, Kevin Gray, the president of the Greater Kansas City Sports Commission,
said the Overland Park initiative would not hinder efforts to build a new arena in downtown
Kansas City (Cooper 2003c). Gray, however, did admit that the possibility of two arenas and
two minor league hockey teams in the Kansas City region would undercut each other vying for
fans and business (Cooper 2003c).
The uncoordinated race to build an arena in five locations leaves open the possibility that
the region could end up with two or more arenas. Competition to build the first arena is not
harmful to the region, provided that those who do not come in first place practice mutual
adjustment and do not then continue to compete to build a second, third, fourth, or a fifth arena.
If each community single-mindedly, independently, and relentlessly maximizes their self-interest
through avoidance and duplication, then a Pareto inferior outcome is likely to result as the
existing arenas will perform sub-optimally and the jurisdictions and the region will suffer as a
result. However, through communication, coordination, and mutual adjustment, a
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complementary rather than a fragmented and duplicative strategy can be developed that achieves
Pareto optimality.
Conclusion: The Nature of Metropolitan Governance
As hypothesized, the dominant pattern of metropolitan governance in the Kansas City
metro area is one of intergovernmental cooperation and coordination, punctuated by conflict or
avoidance when there is infrequent interaction and the involvement and influence of the regional
council of government is limited. Like Washington D.C. and Pittsburgh, the Kansas City region
exhibits mutual adjustment between most cities and public entities and for most of the public
services included in this study. Unlike the Pittsburgh region, however, where public-private
regimes are the rule, most service delivery arrangements in the Kansas City region are
intergovernmental. Like Los Angeles, New York City, and St. Louis, the Kansas City region
exhibits regional intergovernmental conflict and avoidance among some cities and in a few
public services such as utilities, land use, economic development, and tourism.
Consistent with theories of cooperation, this research finds that cooperation is more
evident when there is regular and expected interaction such as in joint agreements and when
cities partner with the regional council of government. It is not surprising or coincidental that
intergovernmental cooperation is more common than conflict or avoidance given that a majority
(53%) of all intergovernmental service delivery arrangements involve a joint initiative and a
partnership with MARC.
Also consistent with theories of cooperation, conflict and avoidance are more evident
when intergovernmental service delivery arrangements involve a service contract, the transfer of
authority and responsibility to another public entity, or when the influence and presence of the
council of government is limited. In the first two instances, there is infrequent interaction and/or
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little expectation of future communication unless there is a problem. In the third instance, there is
the absence of a network broker that can build social capital and facilitate collective action.
These findings call for structuring intergovernmental service delivery arrangements to
include more opportunities for shared governance between public officials and with the regional
council of government, particularly when there is a principal-agent relationship such as in an
intergovernmental contract, or when the responsibility and authority for delivering a service is
centralized either at the county level, a special district, public authority, or the regional council of
government. For example, local governing body members and city administrators can build into
their schedules informal and formal meetings with their counterparts at the agent agency or the
central authority to discuss and solve issues of common interest and concern and share future
plans rather than waiting until there is a problem. Policy makers at the central authority or agent
agency should solicit input from local officials before important decisions are made, and local
officials should not be shy about proactively offering their advice about important issues that are
under consideration. Establishing a more integrated regional community will take more time and
effort and will not always work smoothly, but doing so will make it more possible to address and
solve important metropolitan issues involving public health, the environment, land use, utilities,
public safety, public works, homeland security and disaster preparedness, urban sprawl, traffic
congestion, crime, affordable housing, economic development, and public education— issues
that affect and are important to all Americans regardless of where they live.
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Notes
1

I want to extend a special thanks to LeAnne Ochs who assisted in interviewing city
administrators in the Kansas City region.
2

Of the 46 cities in the data set, 27 cities were located on the Missouri side of the metro and 19
cities were located on the Kansas side of the metro. The Mid-America Regional Council
planning area includes eight counties, five counties on the Missouri side of the metro (Jackson,
Platte, Cass, Clay, and Ray) and three counties on the Kansas side of the metro (Wyandotte,
Johnson, and Leavenworth).
3

The 28 public services included in the study are as follows: solid waste collection, solid waste
disposal, airport, public transit, traffic control, streets (border), stormwater, water, sanitary
sewer, contractor licensing, police, fire, ambulance, police academy, emergency preparedness, 91-1, jails, elderly programs, childcare, public health, recreation, parks/trails, zoo, economic
development, tourism, land use, affordable housing, and purchasing.
4

The interview instrument asked city administrators to indicate which service delivery method
or methods were used for each of the 28 public services at the sub-regional and regional levels so
responses could be standardized. City administrators were provided a listing of the service
delivery options at the sub-regional and regional levels and asked to indicate which option (s)
best characterized the way a service was delivered. City administrators were asked to describe
the way each service was delivered and the partners involved. Based on the city administrators’
explanation, the interviewer recorded the most appropriate service delivery method (s) used at
the sub-regional and regional levels. In a few instances, when city administrators were not
familiar enough with how a service was delivered, they called the appropriate department head
for clarification.
At the sub-regional, city administrators could choose one or more of the following
service delivery methods for each public service:
1. A service is performed entirely by the private sector,
2. The city contracts independently with the private sector to deliver a service only for city
residents,
3. The city provides a service in-house independently to its citizens,
4. The city partners with other public entities to contract with the private sector,
5. The city enters into a joint initiative with another public entity (entities),
6. The city contracts with another public entity (entities),
7. The city has transferred a service to another public entity (entities) or another public
entity has full responsibility to provide the service to the city’s residents,
8. The city specializes in a service available to citizens in another jurisdiction, and/or
9. The city has consolidated with another city or the county.
At the regional level, city administrators could choose one or more of the following
service delivery methods for each public service:
1. The city partners with another public entity (entities) to contract with the private sector,
2. The city enters into a joint initiative with another entity (entities),
3. The city contracts with another public entity (entities) to perform a service,
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4. The city has transferred the responsibility of a service entirely to another public entity
(entities),
5. The city specializes in a regional service that is used by citizens in the region, and/or
6. The city partners with the regional council of government, MARC, to provide technical
training, planning, funding, coordination, and/or the management of a particular service.
5

The seven cities in Missouri were: Liberty, Kansas City, North Kansas City, Riverside, Sugar
Creek, Raymore, and Harrisonville. The six cities in Kansas were: Kansas City, Merriam,
Gardner, Overland Park, Leawood, and Lenexa.
6

About 700 (30%) of the 2,500 members of the Greater Kansas City Chamber of Commerce live
and work in Johnson County (Babson 2003a; J. Heaster 2003; Alm 2003a)
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